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Abstract
This paper will clarify the nuclear policy of the administration of United
States (US) President Donald Trump by critically examining two documents and
one particular event. The first document is the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR),
submitted to the US Congress by the Trump administration on February 2,
2018; the second one is the Missile Defense Review (MDR), submitted
accordingly on January 17, 2019. The above-mentioned event was the
withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) on
February 2, 2019. These documents along with the withdrawal clearly display
the essence of the US nuclear policy and strategy. In general, President Trumpʼs
nuclear policy is quite different from those of the previous administrations. It
adopts an “America First” policy in every field—for example, by withdrawing
from important international treaties and commitments. It also completely
opposes the principle of international cooperation and collaboration.
Additionally, it is seeking to acquire unrivaled military strength mainly through
nuclear forces and by denying the rules of international law and international
organizations. It also is changing the fundamental norms of international peace
and security. This paper criticizes many aspects of President Trumpʼs nuclear
policy, and researches on what exactly is the strategy he is pursuing.
I Nuclear Posture Review
In February 2018, the United States (US) Secretary of Defense James Mattis
submitted the Trump administrationʼs Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)1) to
Congress. The report specified the future US nuclear policy and its decisive
influence on the progress of the issues surrounding nuclear weapons regarding
international diplomacy. This is the fourth report, following those produced by the
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1) Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018, Washington DC: US Department of Defense. https://
dod.defense.gov/News/SpecialReports/2018NuclearPostureReview.aspx
administrations of President Bill Clinton in 1994, President George W. Bush in
2002, and President Barack Obama in 2010.
1 Perception of the International Security Environment and Threat
In the preface of the NPR, Secretary Mattis made the following statement:
For the decade, the United States led the world in efforts to reduce the
role and number of nuclear weapons. Today, Russia is modernizing these
weapons as well as its other strategic systems. Even more troubling has been
Russiaʼs adoption of military strategies and capabilities that rely on nuclear
escalation for their success. China, too, is modernizing and expanding its
already considerable nuclear forces. Like Russia, China is pursuing entirely
new nuclear capabilities tailored to achieve particular national security
objectives while also modernizing its conventional military, challenging
traditional US military superiority in the Western Pacific.2)
The report perceives a marked worsening of global threat conditions since the
2010 NPR. It concludes that the current threat environment and future uncertainties
necessitate a national commitment to maintain modern and effective nuclear forces
and the infrastructure necessary to support them.
The report describes the international security situation as follows: “Since
2010, we have seen the return of Great Power competition. To varying degrees,
Russia and China have made clear they seek to substantially revise the post-Cold
War international order and norms of behavior.”
The report stresses that the Russian strategy and doctrine emphasizes the
potential coercive and military use of nuclear weapons, and it mistakenly assesses
that the threat of nuclear escalation or actual first use of nuclear weapons would
serve to “de-escalate” a conflict in favorable terms to Russia. It also mentions that
China continues to increase the number, capabilities, and protection of its nuclear
forces and that while its declaratory policy and doctrine have not changed, its lack
of transparency regarding the scope and scale of its nuclear modernization program
raises questions regarding its future intent.3)
In contrast, the previous three US administrations did not perceive Russia as
an enemy. During the Clinton administration, Russia was no longer perceived as an
enemy and subsequently the imminent threats were considered to be nuclear
terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.4)
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The Bush administration believed that while some contingencies were
necessary for Russia, the present and most serious threats were nuclear weapons,
chemical weapons, biological weapons, and the missile delivery systems possessed
by many states. In particular, the most threatening problems were the so-called
rogue states such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria.5)
The Obama administration recognized that the most serious threat was no
longer Russia, but rather nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation. The Obama
administration attempted to reduce the confrontation and succeeded in its “reset” of
their confrontational relationship.6)
The Trump administration began working on its NPR when the security
environment with Russia disintegrated, and its subsequent NPR stresses that the
most imminent security threat to the US is recent Russian behavior. Russia
possesses many non-strategic nuclear weapons, and by modernizing them, it
adopted a new military doctrine. Additionally, it behaves contrary to the rules of
international law and international commitments, and subsequently, the US believes
that Russia is bringing the world back to a great-power competition. As a result,
the Trump NPR perceives Russia as the most imminent threat to the US.
Additionally, the Trump administration sees China as a threat because they are
modernizing and expanding their nuclear weapons and challenging traditional US
supremacy in the Western Pacific. The emphasis on the great-power competition is
one of the most significant characteristics of this new NPR.
2 The Role of Nuclear Weapons
I will discuss the issues of the policy concerning the use of nuclear weapons,
the policy of no first use, and negative security assurances. Regarding the policy on
the use of nuclear weapons, the Trump NPR declares, “the United States would
only consider the employment of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to
defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and partners.” The same
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sentence appears in the Obama NPR. However, in the Trump NPR, it is followed
by a passage that significantly changes its meaning:
Extreme circumstances could include significant non-nuclear strategic
attacks. Significant non-nuclear strategic attacks include, but are not limited
to, attacks on the United States, allies, or partner civilian population or
infrastructure, and attacks on the United States, or allied nuclear forces, their
command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities.7)
The Trump NPR emphasizes the role of nuclear weapons against attacks from
both nuclear and conventional weapons, as it mentions the “deterrence of nuclear
and non-nuclear attacks” as the first and most important role of nuclear weapons.
This position is different from that of the Obama NPR, which attempted to limit
the employment of nuclear weapons only to responding to nuclear attacks. The
Obama NPR stated that the fundamental role of US nuclear weapons was to deter
nuclear attacks on the US and its allies and partners. According to that document,
the role of US nuclear weapons as a deterrence and a response to non-nuclear
attacks—conventional, biological, or chemical—had declined significantly and the
US would continue to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear
attacks.8)
James Acton states that the Trump NPR includes a seemingly innocuous threat
to consider using nuclear weapons if an adversary launches non-nuclear attacks
against the US nuclear command and control, warning abilities, or attack
assessment capabilities. He then critically points out that this threat marks a
significant—and unwelcome—departure from US declaratory policy, and such a
response would be utterly disproportionate, and lacks credibility and could prove
both ineffective and damaging to US interests.9)
George Perkovich criticizes the Trump NPR because it declares an intention to
use nuclear weapons against cyberattacks. He provides three points in this regard,
the first of which is nuclear war would be much more devastating to the US than
any conceivable cyberattack. Second, it is irrational to retaliate with nuclear
weapons, as the combined conventional and cyber capabilities of the US are greater
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than those of its adversaries. Finally, international humanitarian law (IHL) requires
that military operations be strictly necessary, that their harm be proportionate to the
objectives, and that they do not cause unnecessary suffering.10)
Regarding the policy of “no first use” of nuclear weapons, which limits the
use of nuclear weapons only to the scenario of nuclear attacks from another state,
neither the Obama nor the Trump NPR adopted this policy. The Trump NPR
argues that the US has never adopted a “no first use” policy and, given the
contemporary threat environment, such a policy is currently not justified. On the
other hand, the Obama NPR used the phrase “the sole purpose,” which has almost
the same meaning as “no first use.” The Obama administration explained that the
US was not prepared at the time to adopt a universal policy stating that “the sole
purpose” of US nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attacks on the US but would
work to establish conditions under which such a policy could be safely adopted.11)
The Obama administration strongly contended that this idea should be vigorously
pursued.
As for negative security assurances, the Trump and Obama NPRs reflect the
same policy in the main part, which is that “the United States will not use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and in
compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.” However, the Trump
NPR includes a provision that given the potential for significant non-nuclear
strategic attacks, the US reserves the right to make any adjustment in their
assurance, which may be warranted due to the evolution and proliferation of non-
nuclear strategic attack technologies and US capabilities to counter that threat.12)
Yet, the Obama NPR reserved the right to adjust the assurances that may be
required due to the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons and the
capabilities to counter that threat.
3 Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Capabilities
Regarding nuclear strategy, the key elements of the Trump NPR are the
application of a tailored approach that will effectively deter a spectrum of
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adversaries, threats, and context and the adoption of flexibility to have the
appropriate range and mix of nuclear and other capabilities. Russia could threaten
limited nuclear first use, suggesting a mistaken expectation that coercive nuclear
threats or limited first use could paralyze the US and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and thereby end a conflict on terms favorable to Russia,
which is called Russiaʼs “escalate to de-escalate doctrine.” In order to correct any
Russian misperceptions of advantage and credibly deter Russian nuclear or non-
nuclear strategic attacks, the US President must have a range of limited as well as
graduated options. China has emerged as a major challenge to US interests in Asia
through its military modernization and pursuit of regional dominance. The tailored
strategy for China is designed to prevent them from mistakenly concluding that it
could secure an advantage through the limited use of its nuclear theater
capabilities.13)
Regarding nuclear capabilities, the nuclear triad remains the central element of
US nuclear capabilities, consisting of nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)
armed with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs); land-based
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); and strategic bombers carrying gravity
bombs and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). There are currently four active
replacement programs. One is the sea-based deterrent force where the Columbia-
class program will deliver a minimum of 12 SSBNs to replace the current Ohio
fleet. As a replacement of the ICBM, the US will begin fielding the Ground-Based
Strategic Deterrence (GBSD). Another program is for strategic bombers, where the
US will develop and deploy the next-generation bomber, the B-21 Raider. Finally,
the long-range standoff (LRSO) system will be introduced as the replacement for
the aging ALCMs.14)
One of the most notable characteristics of this NPR is the significant
enhancement of deterrence with non-strategic nuclear capabilities. Russiaʼs belief
that limited nuclear first use—potentially including low-yield weapons—can
provide an advantage is partly based on their perception that their greater number
and variety of non-strategic nuclear systems provides a coercive advantage in crises
and lower-level conflicts. The Trump administration thinks that by expanding
flexible US nuclear options now, including low-yield options, is important for the
preservation of a credible deterrence against regional aggression.15)
In connection with this emphasis on non-strategic nuclear forces, Steven Pifer
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critically analyzes the concept itself with the following observation:
Getting into a competition in low-yield nuclear arms runs the risk of
inadvertently signaling that use of low-yield non-strategic nuclear weapons
would be seen as different from strategic nuclear arms and somehow might be
acceptable. However, it is profoundly in the American interest that in a
conflict, nuclear weapons not be used. It would wiser to seek to raise the
threshold for nuclear use.16)
Maxwell Downman also criticizes this US policy:
Small yield nuclear weapons with increased accuracy are destabilizing.
They make nuclear weapons more usable, as they would theoretically cause
fewer indiscriminate civilian casualties. This gives opportunities and
incentives to use nuclear weapons in a wider set of conflict scenarios. By
developing a range of low-yield options, the United States is beginning to
mimic the Russian policies they frequently criticize.17)
In the near term, The Trump administration plans to modify a small number of
existing SLBM warheads to provide a low-yield option and in the longer term, they
will pursue modern nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). The
reason for the development of a low-yield warhead is to ensure a prompt-response
option that can penetrate the defenses of adversaries.
SLCMs will provide a much-needed non-strategic regional presence as well as
an assured response capability. Additionally, they represent a response to Russiaʼs
continuing violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty)
that is compliant with the treaty. The US pursuit of SLBMs may provide the
necessary incentive for Russia to seriously negotiate a reduction of its non-
strategic nuclear weapons, just as the prior Western deployment of intermediate-
range nuclear forces in Europe led to the 1987 INF Treaty.18) This option goes in
the opposite direction from the one taken by the Obama NPR, which decided to
withdraw nuclear-armed SLCMs.
Steven Pifer also criticizes the Trump NPR policy of modifying existing
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SLBM warheads to provide a low-yield option:
While submarine-launched ballistic missiles have traditionally been
regarded as strategic, the new NPR describes the low-yield Trident D5
warheads as bolstering US regional non-strategic nuclear capabilities. But this
concept prompts questions. First, could a Trident D5 launch be
misinterpreted? It would not be clear that the warhead is “small” until it
detonated over a target. Second, the reason the United States maintains such a
large portion of its nuclear warheads on submarines is that they are hard to
find and thus survivable. However, a submarine firing a Trident missile to
deliver a low-yield warhead would reveal its location. Would the US Navy
want to risk that?19)
Regarding nuclear weapons infrastructure, the Trump NPR expresses its
intention to resume nuclear testing, and does not exclude the development of new
nuclear weapons.20) Contrarily, the Obama NPR clearly stated, “the United States
will not conduct nuclear testing and will pursue ratification and entry into force of
the CTBT [Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty]. The United States will not
develop new nuclear warheads.”21)
4 Nuclear Disarmament
I will discuss the following four issues in connection with nuclear
disarmament. First, regarding the NPT, the Trump NPR understands that the NPT
is the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and stresses that the US
remains committed to nuclear nonproliferation, continues to abide by its obligations
under the NPT, and will work to strengthen the NPT regime.22)
When considering the CTBT, the Trump NPR recognizes its effectiveness, but
it will not seek its ratification from the Senate and reserves the option of resuming
nuclear testing.23) In contrast, the Obama NPR stated that the US would not
conduct nuclear testing and would pursue ratification and entry into force of the
CTBT.24)
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The Trump NPR flatly rejects the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons with this statement:
It is important to recognize that the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty,
opened for signature at the UN in 2017, is fueled by wholly unrealistic
expectations of the elimination of nuclear arsenals without the prerequisite
transformation of the international security environment. This effort has
polarized the international community and seeks to inject disarmament issues
into non-proliferation fora, potentially damaging the non-proliferation regime.
This Treaty could damage US security and the security of many allies and
partners who rely on US extended nuclear deterrence.25)
On US-Russia nuclear reductions, the Trump NPR only says that the New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) “is in effect through February
2021 and with mutual agreement, may be extended for up to five years to 2026.”26)
It is not clear whether the Trump administration is willing to continue the nuclear
reduction process or to extend the treaty. By stating that further progress is
difficult, the Trump NPR seems to indicate that the Trump administration does not
plan to take any positive action on nuclear arms control.
The Obama administration said in their 2010 NPR that they would conclude a
verifiable New START; push ratification and early entry into force of the CTBT;
seek commencement of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT);
and initiate a comprehensive national research and development program to support
continued progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons.27)
Maggie Tennis and Strobe Talbott sharply criticized the Trump NPR:
Trump ignores Americaʼs responsibility since the dawn of the atomic age
to avoid Armageddon and maintain a commitment to arms control and non-
proliferation. His words suggest a willingness in both the administration and
Congress to risk key nuclear treaties, like the 1987 Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction
(New START) Treaty, for the sake of muscle-flexing and displays of military
might. This trend is misguided and ruinous. Without concerted efforts to
maintain INF and New START, the arms control regime could fall apart.28)
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5 Evaluation of the Nuclear Posture Review
The most significant characteristics of the Trump NPR are the perception of
Russia and China as enemies along with the declared need to modernize and
strengthen the US nuclear arsenal in order to win the great-power competition with
those two countries.
Anna Peczeli states that the justification for the proposed modernization
program is questionable and that these steps might lead to a renewed arms race in
low-yield nuclear capabilities. This could force Russia and China to lower the
nuclear threshold, undermining the security of the US and its allies, and weakening
alliance cohesion and solidarity.29)
The Trump NPR, by emphasizing the threat from Russia and China, is
planning to improve nuclear forces, mainly in the intermediate range, and to
increase the role of nuclear weapons by broadening the circumstances in which
nuclear weapons can be used. Furthermore, the Trump NPR has no interest in
nuclear arms control and disarmament. In short, it indicates that the US will select
the route of unilaterally strengthening its military power and rejecting international
cooperation to reduce the tension among states.
II Missile Defense Review
The Trump administrationʼs MDR,30) which was submitted on January 17,
2019, is radically different from the Obama administrationʼs 2010 Ballistic Missile
Defense Review (BMDR)31) in many aspects. It is true that security circumstances
have changed, but the unique characteristics of the Trump administration appear in
many areas.
1 The Content of the Missile Defense Review
President Trump introduced a very ambitious and comprehensive initiative,
explaining, “Our goal is simple: to ensure that we can detect and destroy any
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30)Missile Defense Review. 2019, Washington DC: US Department of Defense. https://media.
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31) Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, February 2010. Washington DC: US Department of
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for%20web.pdf
missile launched against the United States—anywhere, anytime, anyplace,” and “in
a time of rapidly evolving threats, we must be certain that our defensive
capabilities are unrivaled and unmatched anywhere in the world.”32)
Then, he emphasized the following six major changes in missile defense
policy would be necessary for a new strategy. First, the US will prioritize the
defense of American people above all else. The US is committed to establishing a
missile defense program that can shield every city in the US. Second, the US will
focus on developing new technologies. The US must pursue advanced technology
and research to guarantee that they are always several steps ahead of those who
would do the US harm. Third, the US will now adjust its posture in order to defend
against any missile strikes—including cruise and hypersonic missiles.
Fourth, the US will recognize that space is a new warfighting domain, with
the Space Force leading the way. Regardless of the missile type or the
geographic origins of an attack, the US will ensure that enemy missiles find no
sanctuary on Earth or in the skies above. Fifth, the US will remove bureaucratic
obstacles in order to dramatically speed up the acquisition and deployment of
new technology. Finally, the US will insist on fair burden sharing with their
allies. In furtherance of this goal, this plan directs the Department of Defense to
prioritize the sale of American missile defense and technology to US allies and
its partners.
The main elements of the content of the report are the following four areas
including evolving threat environment, role of missile defense, missile defense
programs and capabilities, and working with its allies and partners.
One of the areas the report discusses at some length is the evolving threat
environment. The discussion encompasses these three topics:
(1) The threat to the US homeland. The report emphasizes that while the US
relies on deterrence to protect against large and technically sophisticated
Russian and Chinese ICBM threats to the US homeland, an active US
missile defense can and must outpace existing and potential rogue state
offensive missile capabilities.
(2) Missile threats to US forces abroad, as well as its allies and partners.
Expanding and modernizing US regional missile defenses is imperative in
order to meet these ongoing advancements by adversaries in regional
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offensive missile capabilities.
(3) Potential advancements by adversariesʼ missile defense and anti-satellite
(ASAT) weapons. The report says that potential adversaries have long made
substantial investments in their own missile defense systems. Russia and
China are also developing ASAT capabilities that could threaten US space-
based assets.33)
The report lists the following roles of the missile defense: (1) protection of the
US homeland, forces abroad, its allies, and partners; (2) deterrence of attacks
against the US, its allies, and partners; (3) assurance of its allies; (4) strengthening
of US diplomatic efforts; (5) stabilization by missile defense; (6) hedging against
future risks; and (7), enabling regional military operations.
The report lists the following principles of the missile defense: (1) US
homeland missile defense will stay ahead of rogue statesʼ missile threat; (2) missile
defense will defend US forces deployed abroad and support the security of its allies
and partners; and (3) the US will pursue new concepts and technologies.
It also lists the following elements of missile defense: (1) comprehensive
missile defense capabilities including active missile defense, passive missile
defense, and attack operations; (2) flexibility and adaptability; (3) tighter offense-
defense integration and interoperability; and (4) importance of space.34)
Concerning the US missile defense programs and it capabilities, it lists four
activities. The first activity is the strengthening and increasing of the ground-based
midcourse defense (GMD) for homeland security purposes. The second is for
regional active defense and it involves the upgrade of the Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD), improvement of the Aegis sea-based missile defense
system, deployment of Aegis Ashore in Poland, and the improvement of the Patriot
Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile. Third, as new systems, there will be the
development of intercepting offensive missiles in their boost phase, high-energy
laser technology, space-basing for sensors, as well as space-basing of interceptors.
Finally, there will be an attack operation in place before any missiles are
launched.35)
With regard to working with allies and partners, it emphasizes deepening
interoperability and expanding burden sharing.36)
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In conclusion, the MDR summarizes its contents of the review, stating:
This 2019 MDR [Missile Defense Review] establishes a policy
framework for US missile defense that is responsive to new threats and
exploits new approaches to the defensive mission. Moving forward, the United
States, its allies, and partners will pursue a comprehensive missile defense
strategy that will deliver integrated and effective capabilities to counter
ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missile threats. The BMDs [ballistic missile
defenses] of the United States must be continuously strengthened and
expanded given the growing challenges posed by potential adversaries,
particularly rogue states.37)
2 Arguments Against the Missile Defense Review
Frank A. Rose evaluates US missile defense as follows:
(1) On homeland missile defense, plans of deploying 20 additional long-
range interceptors in Alaska, improving the kill vehicle on the long-range
interceptors, additional discrimination radars in Alaska, Hawaii, and other
locations, upgrading existing radars, and examining the feasibility of the
SM-3 Block IIA interceptor to engage certain ICBM-class threats.
(2) On regional missile defense and cooperation with its allies and partners,
there should be an assessment of the need for additional THAAD systems, a
continuation of the deployment of the Aegis Ashore site in Poland, and an
increase of the number of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)-capable
warships.
(3) For the boost-phase defense system, the MDR recommends exploring
two boost-phase intercept options: an F-35 Lightning fighter plane armed
with a kinetic interceptor and a compact high-energy laser on an unmanned
drone. Rose recommends their research and development but warns that the
operational and technical challenges should not be underestimated.
(4) On the research and development of a space-based sensor layer, Rose
points out that it is certain to face technical, operational, and cost-related
challenges.
(5) For space-based interceptors, Rose says that it would not only involve
technical and cost concerns, it would have significant strategic and political
implications, as Russia and China are certain to react.38)
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Kingston A. Reif states that the review expands the purpose of missile defense
to defend against cruise and hypersonic missiles. He proposes a more aggressive
defense against Russian and Chinese regional missile threats; alludes to the future
development of airborne interceptors for “boost-phase” missile defense; and
proposes to augment the defense of the US homeland with additional ground-
based and sea-based Aegis SM-3 IIA missile interceptors. One point on which he
expresses concern is that the goal of US missile defense is to “ensure we can detect
and destroy any missile launched against the United States anywhere, anytime,
anyplace,” to which, he argues, would be costly, unachievable, and destabilizing.
Another criticism from him is that the review proposes “to further thicken
defensive capabilities for the US homeland” with the new Aegis SM-3 Block IIA
interceptors. This would have an adverse impact on Russian and Chinese threat
perceptions and increase the risk of instability. He recommends that the US pursue
a wide-ranging dialogue with Russia and China on strategic stability.39)
Benjamin Zala points out that the US missile defense system ultimately is
supposed to defend against the arsenals of Russia and China, and the official policy
of the US is to no longer rely on nuclear deterrence based on mutual vulnerability
to keep the chances of nuclear war as low as possible.40)
The general trend of the evaluations of the Trump MDR can be summarized
as follows: The parts taken over from the previous review that focused on rogue
states such as North Korea and Iran are generally accepted, but they are very
aggressive and ambitious new elements. These harshly criticized elements include
such new programs against Russia and China, attacks on missiles during the boost
stage, deployment of sensors in space, deployment of interceptors in space, and
attacks against missiles before launching. Obamaʼs BMDR made defending against
near-term regional threats a top priority of its missile defense plans, programs and
capabilities. President Obamaʼs report also directed to sustain and enhance the US
militaryʼs ability to defend the homeland against attack by a small number of long-
range ballistic missiles. It also sought to engage Russia and China on missile
defense through the shared early warning of missile launches, possible technical
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cooperation, and even operational cooperation.41)
The ambitious and futuristic recommendations within the Trump
MDR—including attack during boost stage and deployment of space sensors and
space interceptors—will be technically and economically be very challenging to
accomplish. Additionally, these ambitious recommendations, if implemented,
would pose a threat to international peace and security.
III Withdrawal from the INF Treaty
1 Announcement of the Withdrawal
On February 2, 2019, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made the following
statement:
Today the United States provided Russia and other Treaty Parties with
formal notice that the United States will withdraw from the INF Treaty in six
months, pursuant to Article XV of the Treaty. The United States has
concluded that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty
arising from Russiaʼs continued noncompliance have jeopardized the United
Statesʼ supreme interest, and the United States can no longer be restricted by
the Treaty while Russia violates it. If Russia does not return to full and
verifiable compliance with the Treaty by eliminating all 9M729 missiles, their
launchers, and associated equipment in this six-month period, the Treaty will
terminate.42)
One day before, President Trump stated, “Tomorrow, the United States will
suspend its obligations under the INF Treaty and begin the process of withdrawing
from the INF Treaty.” As for its reason, he explained:
The United States has fully adhered to the INF Treaty for more than 30
years, but we will not remain constrained by its terms while Russia
misrepresents its actions. We cannot be the only country in the world
unilaterally bound by this treaty, or any other. We will move forward with
developing our own military response options and will work with NATO and
our other allies and partners to deny Russia any military advantage from its
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unlawful conduct.43)
Just after the US announcement on its planned withdrawal from the INF
Treaty, Russian President Vladimir Putin said, “As the American partners have
declared that they suspend their participation in the deal, we suspend it as well.”
He also stated his willingness to start working on creating new missiles, including
hypersonic ones, and told his ministers not to initiate disarmament talks with the
US.44) Moreover, he announced:
Russia would match any US move to deploy new nuclear missiles and would
be forced to create and deploy types of weapons which can be used not only in
respect of those territories from which the direct threat to United States originates,
but also in respect of those territories where the centers of decision-making are
located.45)
2 Violation of the INF Treaty
The INF Treaty was implemented without dispute, and the missiles possessed
by the two countries were completely destroyed in three years. However, other
states, such as China, India, Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea, have developed and
deployed missiles prohibited under the INF Treaty. Russia, in particular, expressed
dissatisfaction at the situation, and in 2007 at the United Nations it proposed to
change the treaty into a multilateral treaty, but there was no progress on this point.
In 2014, the US formally criticized Russia for its violation of the INF Treaty
for the first time in Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments.46) Every year
thereafter, the US mentioned Russia’s violation in this report, and in 2018, it
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clearly stated that the system in question was a 9M729 missile. Secretary Pompeo
said that Russia had deployed several battalions of 9M729 missiles in December.
In response to the repeated US warnings about their violation, Russia
repeatedly denied that it had flight-tested a cruise missile with a range that would
violate the INF Treaty. President Trump, on October 20, 2018, expressed with this
statement his intent to withdraw from the treaty.
Russia has violated the agreement. They have been violating it for many
years. We are not going to let them violate a nuclear agreement and we are
not allowed to. We are the ones that have stayed in the agreement and we
have honored the agreement, but Russia has not unfortunately honored the
agreement, so we are going to terminate the agreement, we are going to pull
out.47)
On December 4, Secretary Pompeo stated that as Russia had committed the
material breach of the treaty, the US would suspend, as a corrective measure, the
obligations effective in three months unless Russia would come back to a complete
and verifiable compliance.
Russia also asserts that the US is violating the INF Treaty in connection with
the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). This includes the Aegis Ashore
system stationed in Romania, which deployed the similar MK–41 Vertical
Launching System (VLS) which is deployed on Aegis-enabled warships. Russia
argues that if the MK–41 VLS is deployed on land, it can be used to launch
intermediate-range missiles, which will be a clear violation of the treaty.
The US responded to this argument by announcing:
The SM-3 interceptor missile system is a type of missile that has been
developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the
surface of the Earth. Although it utilizes some of the same structural
components as the sea-based MK-41 Vertical Launch System installed on
ships, the Aegis Ashore vertical launching system is not the same launcher as
the sea-based MK-41 Vertical Launch System.48)
Referencing this dispute, Theodore Postol said, “Publicly available
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information makes it clear that the Aegis-based systems in Eastern Europe, if
equipped with cruise missiles, would violate the INF.49) He also noted, “The actual
facts of the matter support the Russian position. This reality must be considered if
the United States and Russia are to come to agree on continued control of
intermediate-range missiles.”50)
Considering the issues of the violation explained above, both the US and
Russia have strongly criticized each other for noncompliance, but both have denied
their own alleged violations. Although both sides strongly argue for the legality of
their own actions, they have neither submitted all of the information regarding
precise facts nor have worked hard for the solution of the dispute at the Special
Verification Committee.
Greg Thielmann and others have proposed, as one option, to seek a trade-off
between two principal INF Treaty compliance issues raised by Washington and
Moscow. Russia could eliminate its 9M729 missiles and launchers in exchange for
a NATO commitment to freeze the expansion of the Aegis ballistic missile
defenses in Europe.51) William Tobey and others proposed the following measures
from a military-technical standpoint: Russia could provide US technical experts
with a demonstration of its technologies believed by the US government to be in
violation of the INF Treaty, including the relevant technical documentation, such as
information on the testing of missiles. The US in return could organize a
demonstration of its missile defense base in Romania for Russian technical
specialists, including explanations of possible technical solutions for precluding the
use of the MK–41 VLS for launchers of attack missiles.52)
The opinions of the two countries have directly contradicted each other and
there have been no consultations between Moscow and Washington, which have
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succeeded in solving the confrontation. Finally, on February 2, 2019, the US
announced its intention to withdraw from the INF Treaty, and they officially
withdrew from it on August 2, 2019.
3 Reasons for the Withdrawal
There are two main reasons that the US decided to withdraw from the INF
Treaty. The US wanted to object to and take countermeasures against Russiaʼs
violation because it wants to compete with China, which is strengthening their
intermediate-range forces without being beholden to the terms of the INF Treaty.
The most fundamental reason for the US to withdraw from the INF Treaty is
based on the their judgment that Russia has flight-tested intermediate-range
missiles for several years and deployed them in 2018. That would be contrary to
Russiaʼs obligations under the treaty. The US is concerned that in a situation of
parity in strategic nuclear forces, the new deployment of intermediate-range nuclear
forces by Russia will give them an advantage. By withdrawing from the treaty, the
US is seeking to eliminate the apparent Russian advantage by freeing itself from
the treatyʼs prohibition of deployment of intermediate-range forces.
However, there are many experts who say that withdrawal is a mistake. First, it
is noted that the US will be strongly criticized politically because they unilaterally
withdrew from it. The US stated that it would withdraw from it because there was
no violation on their side, but Russia is in violation of it. From a legal point of
view, withdrawal is permitted if there really is a substantive violation and it
satisfies the treatyʼs conditions for withdrawal. However, the US will be criticized
if it withdraws from the treaty without clear counterarguments against the argument
that they are also in violation.
Another reason is since the US is withdrawing from the treaty first, Russia
will not be criticized much, even if it violated the treaty. Criticism of Russia will
disappear and they will have the legal and political freedom to take actions that
were prohibited under the treaty. As Russia claims that if the US deploys new
missiles they will follow accordingly, the situation seems more advantageous to
Russia, because now they are free to develop and deploy missiles that were
forbidden under the treaty.
Some experts argue that the US does not need to deploy new ground-
launched missiles, which were prohibited under the treaty, as the US has enough
air- and sea-launched intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Although the Obama
administration judged that the issue of the violation did not have enough impact to
upset the strategic balance between the two states, the Trump administration seems
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to be trying to surpass other states in military power. From that point of view, the
US announced its withdrawal; by rejecting the Treatyʼs limits, the US is trying to
be a militarily powerful country.
An important issue concerning the withdrawal from the INF Treaty has been
mainly a European security issue which is strongly connected to the interests of the
European states. The origin of this issue came from the concern of European states
regarding US nuclear deterrence in the late 1970s. Accordingly, the conclusion of
the INF Treaty was the excellent resolution of this issue. The end of the INF
Treaty would create several serious problems for Europe.
NATO issued a statement saying that it fully supported the decision of the US
to withdraw from the INF Treaty,53) but Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg stated
that NATO did not have any intension to deploy new ground-launched nuclear
weapons to Europe54). In the 1980s, NATO accepted the deployment of new
missiles that promoted negotiations with the Soviet Union. The negotiations
ultimately led to the conclusion of the INF Treaty and the total destruction of the
missiles. However, it is very difficult to imagine the same scenario now because
the NATO member states are opposed to new deployment.
Another reason why the Trump administration wants to withdraw from the
INF Treaty is to take countermeasures against China. The Trump administration
understands that China is now a military threat to the US, as the 2018 Trump NPR
described China as a strategic competitor as well as Russia. Also, in the withdrawal
statement, the US emphasized its concern that nonparties, in particular China, are
increasing and upgrading ground-launched intermediate-range missiles without the
regulation of the treaty. The US also strongly contended for the negotiation of a
multilateral treaty on this issue with China among the parties.
David Sanger noted:
The United States has insisted Russiaʼs action sank the Treaty. But
Trump Administrationʼs real aim is to broaden its prohibitions to include
China and other countries. Constrained by the treatyʼs provisions, the United
States has been prevented from deploying new weapons to counter Chinaʼs
efforts to cement a dominant position in the Western Pacific and keep
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American aircraft carriers at bay. Much of Beijingʼs growing nuclear arsenal
currently consists of missiles that fall into the ranges that are prohibited by the
Treaty. The real action is likely to be in Asia. The Pentagon is preparing to
modify existing weapons, including its non-nuclear Tomahawk missiles, and is
likely to deploy them in Guam.55)
Pranay Vaddi critically asserts:
Analysts have made three arguments in favor of withdrawing from the
INF Treaty and deploying ground-based, intermediate-range missile systems
(GBIRs): US GBIRs will better deter China, GBIRs are far cheaper than US
air and sea platforms, and land-based missiles are more survivable than US
air- and sea-based assets. Each of these arguments has some merit. However,
their proponents ignore the very real political challenges associated with
deploying GBIRs in Asia Pacific region. They also ignore specific military
challenges, including the potential for a missile race and long-term regional
and strategic instability.” He also states, “absent serious consultations with
Asian allies, withdrawing from the INF Treaty and attempting to deploy
GBIRs will likely create a rift between allies, would weaken US relationships
and play into Chinaʼs hands.56)
It is unthinkable that China will become a party to the INF Treaty, and that a
multilateral treaty including China and other states on this issue will be negotiated
under the present circumstances. Although the US claims that it is now free to
deploy this kind of missile in East Asia, there will be unsurmountable political
resistance from Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and Taiwan. As a
result, deploying the missiles in Guam may be the only remaining possibility.
Additionally, there remains the question of how much value the deployment of
ground-launched missiles in Guam will have in comparison with the existing air-
and sea-launched missiles.
4 Challenges to Nuclear Disarmament
First, it is deeply worrying that the extension of New START will be as a
result of the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty. After the extinguishing of the
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INF Treaty, the only treaty in effect regarding nuclear disarmament between the
US and Russia is New START, which was signed in 2010 and entered into force
on February 5, 2011. According to the treatyʼs provisions, it shall remain in force
for 10 years, and if the parties decide to extend this treaty, it will be extended for a
period of no more than five years. Russia has expressed its intention to extend the
treaty, but the US is still reluctant to express its intention.
Alex Moore has argued that the US needs New START. He says that the
treatyʼs mutual limits play a vital role in maintaining stability at the nuclear
threshold by negating the arms race dynamics and making sure that each side has
confidence in the survivability of its nuclear deterrent. Without the verifiable
constraints that New START provides, the US risks lapsing into a US-Russian
nuclear relationship characterized by heightened crisis instability. The agreement
provides the US with invaluable insight into Russiaʼs strategic forces by way of its
verification measures.57)
Frank Klotz claims in the following passage that New START has been and
remains in the military and national security interests of the US.
Whatever happens, the existing mutual limits on strategic nuclear forces
and the associated transparency and verification measures of New START
should not be allowed to expire without replacement. It is manifestly in the
best interests of the United States and Russia to agree to extend New START
as soon as possible, rather than waiting until the last minute to broker a deal.58)
Jon Wolfsthal also emphasizes the importance of the extension of New
START:
By capping the arsenals of both countries, the New START pact brings a
much-needed predictability to the long-standing nuclear relationship between
Washington and Moscow. The expiration of the deal might lead Russia and
the United States to expand further their costly and dangerous nuclear forces
and remove ability of Washington to cooperatively monitor Moscowʼs nuclear
development.59)
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Many experts have presented their case for the extension of New START.
This treaty obligates the reduction of strategic nuclear forces of the US and Russia
to the same lower level. As required by the treaty, this reduction was successfully
completed in seven years. Furthermore, the treaty includes very strict verification
measures such as intrusive onsite inspections. Each of the parties has implemented
the reductions while verifying that the other party is also doing the same. There
have been no clear complaints by either side concerning the other not complying
with its obligations. The treaty functions as one of the most important elements for
the two countries to maintain collaborative development and strategic stability.
With these functions, the INF Treaty has been a very useful tool for peace and
security to both countries. It is expected that the treaty will be extended or should
be superseded by a more attractive one.
However, because of the unique personal nature of President Trump, there is
the possibility that he will refuse to extend the treaty because he dislikes any policy
put in place by the Obama administration or because he believes that the US is an
exceptional nation and it should act freely and get rid of any treaty restriction.
Next, the risk of collapse of the nuclear disarmament regime is also worrying.
Jon Wolfsthal said the following after expressing whatʼs certain is that the end of
the treaty would make the US and its allies less safe and would undermine the
global basis for nuclear restraint and nonproliferation.
And it may get worse. Americaʼs potential withdrawal from the INF
Treaty suggests that the 2010 New START arms reduction treaty with Russia
might be next. The untimely death of these two agreements would add fuel to
a new arms race and further undermine stability and predictability between
Washington and Moscow.60)
Frank A. Rose said that while the end of the INF Treaty is certainly
unfortunate, it is a symptom of a much larger problem: the collapse of the existing
US-Russia strategic stability framework. Rose insists that the US must first closely
coordinate with its allies as it considers how to effectively respond to Russiaʼs new
ground-launched cruise missile capability. Second, the Trump administration and
Congress should take steps to identify what the US wants to achieve in a future
strategic arms control regime. Third, with relations between the US and Russia at
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its lowest point since the end of the Cold War, it is critical to maintain the dialogue
between the two countries regarding strategic issues. Fourth, the US must seriously
consider how best to bring China and other new actors into a future strategic
stability framework. Finally, the US should extend New START in order to
facilitate continued bipartisan domestic political support for strategic nuclear
modernization.61)
If New START disappears after the demise of the INF Treaty, the US-Russia
bilateral nuclear disarmament regime will end. This regime depends on the efforts
of the two states and is extremely useful for not only bilateral peace and security
but also for maintaining and strengthening peace and security for all members of
the international community.
IV Conclusion: Characteristics of the Trump Administrationʼs Nuclear
Policy
In his 2018 State of Union Address, President Trump clearly declared his
fundamental approach to US national security:
Around the world, we face rogue regimes, terrorist groups, and rivals like
China and Russia that challenge our interests, our economy, and our values. In
confronting these dangers, we know that weakness is the surest path to
conflict, and unmatched power is the surest means of our defense. As part of
defense, we must modernize and rebuild our nuclear arsenal, hopefully never
having to use it, but making it so strong and powerful that it will deter any
acts of aggression.62)
What becomes clear from an analysis of the Trump NPR, the Trump MDR,
and the withdrawal from the INF Treaty is that the US relations with other
countries have changed from collaborative to confrontational and have been
moving in a more dangerous direction. The INF Treaty led to the end of the Cold
War and the deep reduction of US and Soviet strategic arms, promoting and
strengthening international cooperation. Also, if New START is abandoned, it
would be difficult to maintain strategic stability which controlled the nuclear arms
race between the two states.
The first characteristic of the Trump administration is that it maintains the
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policy of “America First,” which embodies the administrationʼs unilateralism and
egoism. As in other policy areas, this administration tends to decide on a nuclear
policy based on whether it would be consistent in the narrowest sense with regard
to short-term US interests. The Trump NPR clearly shows the will of the US to
further their lead over any state in military power. The main reason why the US
decided to withdraw from the INF Treaty is that despite the US compliance with
the treaty, Russia has increased its arsenal by violating the treaty. China, which is
not a party to the treaty, is also increasing its arsenal. With regard to missile
defense, US policy is based on the unilateralist belief that the enhancement of US
security is the only outcome that matters and the US has the technical capability to
overcome the countermeasures by other states. This kind of thinking is
fundamentally incompatible with the idea of international collaboration, an
approach through which countries seek to serve the interests of international
society as well as their own national interests.
The second characteristic of the Trump administration is that it is pursuing its
policy not through the rule of law but through the rule of power. The Trump NPR
contains a request for unmatched military power, and the central emphasis of the
Trump MDR is the pursuit of unrivaled and unmatched defense technology and
facilities that can detect and destroy any missiles fired at the US. It includes plans
to attack missiles before they are launched and it designs to increase their military
superiority over other countries. It has plans to strengthen their advanced position
even further over Russia and China in the context of both intermediate-range
missiles and missile defense. Therefore, if New START is not extended, the US
will then seek to expand their lead over Russia and China in strategic forces.
Traditional arguments surrounding nuclear weapons have been based on the
concept of strategic stability among major states. This concept is dependent on
nuclear deterrence based on mutual vulnerability through the theory of mutual
assured destruction (MAD). The unilateral strengthening of defensive forces would
deny mutual vulnerability and help other states strengthen their offensive forces. It
would lead to a nuclear arms race among major states, and subsequently
jeopardizing the security of every state. For nuclear deterrence to work, every state
must keep its vulnerability and international treaties, which regulate their
indispensable offensive and defensive forces. Nuclear deterrence presupposes
dialogue and cooperation among major powers, yet the Trump administration is
now pursuing the policy of unilateral and military victory.
The nuclear policy that the Trump administration is currently pursuing
apparently seeks to destroy almost all longtime treaties, norms, and principles that
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have maintained international peace and security. This situation is very dangerous
to all humanity. The Trump administration seems to be trying to become the only
winner by unilaterally using its power throughout the world. However, it will lead
to nuclear anarchy, resulting in a much more dangerous world.
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